Abstract: Signcryption is a cryptographic primitive which performs encryption and signature in a single logical step. In conventional signcryption only receiver of the signcrypted text can verify the authenticity of the origin i.e. signature of the sender on the message after decrypting the cipher text. In public verifiable signcryption scheme anyone can verify the authenticity of the origin who can access the signcrypted text i.e. signature of the sender on the cipher text. Public verifiable signcryption scheme in which the receiver can convince a third party, by providing additional information other than his private key along with the signcryption is called third party verifiable signcryption schemes. In this paper we proposed an efficient identity based public verifiable signcryption scheme with third party verification and proved its security in the random oracle model.
Introduction:
The main advantages of public key cryptography are encryption and digital signature, used to achieve confidentiality and authenticity of a message respectively. There are scenarios where both primitives are needed (for example secure e-mailing). Earlier signature-thenencryption approach was followed to achieve both primitives. However, this approach has high computational cost and communication overhead. In 1997, Zheng [17] proposed a novel cryptographic primitive "Signcryption" which achieves both confidentiality and authenticity in a single logical step with the cost significantly lower than 'signature-then-encryption' approach. In 2002, Beak et al. [1] first formalize and define security notions for signcryption via semantic security against adaptive chosen cipher text attack and existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attack. Many public key signcryption schemes have been proposed after [17] . Some of them are [2, 9, 10, 18] .
Identity based cryptography was introduced by Shamir [15] in 1984. In the identity based cryptosystem public key of users are their identities (e.g. email address, PAN number etc.) and secret keys of users are created by a trusted third party called private key generator (PKG). First identity based signature scheme was given by Shamir [15] in 1984, but the first identity based encryption scheme was given by Boneh and Franklin [5] in 2001. The first identity based signcryption scheme was proposed by Malone Lee [12] in 2002. They also gave the security model for signcryption in identity based setting. Since then, many identity based signcryption schemes have been proposed in literature [3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13] . Their main objective is to reduce the computational complexity and to design the more efficient identity based signcryption scheme.
In conventional signcryption the sender signs the message which is hide it the receiver's public key. Thus only the receiver can decrypt the message using his/her private key and can verify the authenticity of the cipher text. In the case when receiver wants to prove that indeed the sender has signed the message to a third party then he/she has to reveal his/her private key. In public verifiable signcryption scheme a third party who is unaware of the receiver's private key is able to verify whether a cipher text is valid or not. Public verifiable signcryption schemes have applications in filtering out the spam in a secure email system and private contract signing [14] . In third party verifiable signcryption schemes, a third party is able to verify the integrity and origin of the message using some additional information along with the signcryption provided by the receiver other than his/her private key. Recently in 2010, Selvi et al. [14] showed attacks on confidentiality and unforgeability of the Chow et al. [8] identity based signcryption scheme, which was the only identity based signcryption scheme that provides both public verifiability and third party verification. In [14] Selvi et al. proposed a new identity based signcryption scheme with public verifiability and third party verification and suggested a modification in security notions by providing an additional oracle called third party verifiable (TP-Verify) oracle to the adversary. In this paper we propose an efficient identity based public verifiable signcryption scheme with third party verification and forward security. Also in the security model of [14] TP-Verify oracle does not provide any advantage to the adversary as it is already embedded in the IBPUSC oracle. Also in the proof of Theorem 1 [14] , the simulation of TPVerify oracle depends on the IBPUSC oracle. Thus we consider the security notions for identity based signcryption proposed in [6, 12] . This paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we define identity based signcryption scheme with public verifiability and third party verification and its security model. Section 3 contains the preliminaries for the proposed scheme. In section 4, we give the construction of IBPSC scheme and in section 5 we give the security results for our scheme under the security model defined in section 2. In section 6 we compare our scheme with the existing identity based signcryption schemes with similar properties. We conclude this paper in section 7.
Identity Based Public Verifiable Signcryption (IBPSC):
An identity based public verifiable signcryption (IBPSC) scheme consists of the following algorithms:
Setup:
This algorithm takes input a security parameter k and outputs the system parameters params and a master secret key. The notion of security with respect to confidentiality is indistinguishability of encryptions under adaptive chosen cipher text attack (IND-IBPSC-CCA2). For IBPSC this notion is captured by the following game played between challenger  and adversary  .
Key Generation

GAME 1 (IND-IBPSC-CCA2):
Initialization:  runs the setup algorithm on input a security parameter k, gives public parameters params to the adversary  .  keeps the master key secret.
Queries (Find Stage):
The adversary  makes the following queries adaptively. Note that the confidentiality game described above deals with the insider security since the adversary is given access to the private key of sender * A ID in the challenge.
Cipher text unforgeability:
The notion of security with respect to authenticity is existential unforgeability against chosen message attacks (EUF-IBPSC-CMA). For IBPSC this notion is captured by the following game played between challenger  and adversary  .
GAME 2 (EUF-IBPSC-CMA):
Initialization: Same as in GAME 1.
Queries:
The adversary  asks a polynomially bounded number of queries adaptively as in GAME 1. The adversary  's advantage is its probability of winning the above game.
Definition 3:
An IBPSC scheme is said to EUF-IBPSC-CMA secure if no polynomially bounded adversary  has non-negligible advantage of winning the above game.
Note that in the cipher text unforgeability game described above deals with the insider security since the adversary is given access to the private key of receiver * B ID in the forgery.
Preliminaries:
Let 1  be an additive group and 2  be a multiplicative group both of the same prime order p . A
 is called a bilinear pairing if it satisfies the following properties:
1.
There exists an efficient algorithm to compute
q P aP a P a P to compute 1 2 ( , ) a e P P   is known as q-Bilinear Diffie Hellman inversion problem (q-BDHIP) [4] . 
Key Generation: Given a user U with identity U ID , the private key is computed by PKG as
IBPSC:
The sender A for the receiver B
1. Chooses Note that in the proposed scheme ( , , ) R S T can be seen as the signature of the sender A on the cipher text c, which can be verified without the knowledge of receiver's private key. Thus the proposed identity based signcryption scheme achieves public verifiability. Also it is forward secure as the knowing of sender's private key does not help to decrypt the cipher text. We will proceed similarly as in [3] . In the preparation phase, first  selects 
Thus  can compute
by the last term of the above equation. The system wide public key pub P is chosen as ( )
Now simulator  start the interaction with  on input 4 H is already defined but this happens with a probability smaller than 
Across the whole game the probability to incorrectly reject the signcrypted text at some moment of the simulation is bounded by 
and since z a      , we can check that
 cannot recognize that *  is not a valid signcrypted text unless she queries 3 H with input
. Also in the guess stage, her view is simulated as before and her eventual output is ignored.
Standard arguments can show that a successful  is very likely to query 3 H with input To produce a result,  fetches a random record from 3 L list. As 3 L contains no more than 
In an analysis of  's advantage, following events will cause  to abort the simulation: 
. Thus we find that 
Also the probability that  select the correct record from 4 L list is 
The time bound is obtained as there are Proof: Let  be the EUF-IBPSC-CMA adversary against the proposed IBPSC scheme with advantage  . We will show how adversary  is used to construct a simulator  that solve the q-CAA problem given input
Simulator  starts interaction with  on input 
.  sets the identity as ID  and store the tuple
H H H queries:  answers these queries similarly as in theorem 1. Further the following events will cause  to abort the simulation: 
Key Generation queries:
The time bound is obtained as there are 
Efficiency and Comparison:
Chow et al. [8] scheme was the only identity based signcryption scheme that provides both public verifiability and third party verification and supported by security proof. Recently, Selvi et al. [14] showed attacks on confidentiality and unforgeability of [8] and proposed a new identity based signcryption scheme with public verifiability and third party verification. Thus in the following table we compare our scheme with [14] . Clearly in the proposed scheme only three pairing computations are needed in the unsigncryption phase and no pairing calculation is needed in signcryption phase. Table 1 7. Conclusion: In this paper we proposed an efficient identity based signcryption scheme with public verifiability and third party verification. In the proposed scheme only three pairing computations are needed in the unsigncryption phase and no pairing calculation is needed in signcryption phase. We compare our scheme with the existing identity based signcryption schemes with similar properties. We also gave the proofs of security based on q-BDHIP and q-CAA problem in the random oracle model.
